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This study investigates a growing issue for hotels and consumers: pricing across distribution chan-
nels. Research suggests that hotels should drive consumers towards direct channels with lower
operating costs and away from intermediaries, yet few studies have investigated pricing practices
across the direct communication channels that hotels control. The results of two surveys of over
100 Swiss hotels illustrate pricing inconsistencies in low- and high-season periods across four
communication media under the properties’ direct control: telephone, email, static website price
lists, and reservation request forms on the website. About one out of two hotels offered different
rates across these media, despite the requests being on the same date, for the same type room for
the same period. Prices via email responses were the lowest in the low-season survey and website
prices were lowest in the high-season survey. Across both surveys, prices were lower via online
media—email, static website price lists, and reservation request forms—than via the telephone.
Hotel category and number of stars showed a positive relationship with consistent pricing in the
low season, and a negative relationship in the high season. Finally, price variations of over 200%—
for the same room at the same date—across a hotel’s direct online and offline channels serve as a
wake-up call for hoteliers to review their pricing and procedures for communicating this pricing.
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Introduction son & Failmezger, 2005). Hoteliers that success-
fully adopt electronic distribution should add value,
develop their brand, and build customer loyalty; Anticipated over a decade ago (Emmer, Tauck,
Wilkinson, & Moore, 1993), electronic distribu- those that fail may lose their customer base to in-
termediaries (Sigala & Buhalis, 2002). tion in the hospitality industry has arrived, along
with myriad questions on how this evolving distri- The Internet is a double-edged sword for hotel-
iers. The market continues to grow, with online bution will affect operators and consumers (Caroll
& Siguaw, 2003; O’Connor, 2003; O’Connor & purchasing expanding from business and leisure
travelers to include corporate travel (Caroll & Frew, 2002; O’Connor & Piccoli, 2003; Thomp-
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Siguaw, 2003). Furthermore, wired consumers are Tso & Law, 2005). In a prescient prediction of
online travel, Thompson and Failmezger (2005) affluent and frequent travelers (O’Connor, 2003).
An Australian study found that online travelers posited that these price differences would “spur
the emergence of travel search engines (i.e., meta- spent twice as much as their offline counterparts
(Bolin, 2002). search engines) that can find the best room rate
across all channels” (p. 14). In their July issue, Yet perceptions of better prices online have
consumers shopping for last-minute hotel bargains Laptop Magazine (Potter, 2005) labeled the meta-
travel search engine, Kayak.com, as an Editor’s via web-based intermediaries and hotel websites
(Enz, 2003; O’Connor & Frew, 2002; O’Connor Choice and five-star travel super searcher.
A limitation of these meta-search engines is & Piccoli, 2003; Thompson & Failmezger, 2005;
Varini, Engelmann, Claessen, & Schleusener, 2003). gathering prices via hotel direct channels such as
calling or emailing the hotel, or viewing static prices Repeatedly offloading unsold rooms via these on-
line channels creates a dangerous precedent as on the hotel’s website. Furthermore, compared to
calling the hotel, many online channels—particu- customers quickly learn to wait for better deals.
For hotels offering last-minute pricing, “the de- larly the intermediaries—may mislead consumers
on room availability (Thompson & Failmezger, mand boost will not be large, but the loss of reve-
nue will be painful” (Enz, 2003, p. 5). 2005). The prevailing online channel suggestion,
however, is to drive customers to the hotel’s own In addition to demand-based pricing (Hanks,
Cross, & Noland, 2002; Toh & Dekay, 2002), website rather than to an intermediary’s website
(O’Connor & Piccoli, 2003; Thompson & Fail- management can draw upon technology in order
to limit pricing products as commodities. Busi- mezger, 2005). Yet what happens when consumers
land on the hotel’s website, call the hotel, or email nesses can segment markets and price based on
customer’s purchasing behavior and website navi- the hotel?
While previous studies explored hotel pricing gation patterns (Ancarani, 2002; Iyer, Miyazaki,
Grewal, & Giordano, 2002; Sotgiu & Ancarani, practices across direct and indirect channels (Leh-
man, 2003; O’Connor, 2003; Thompson & Fail- 2004; Yelkur & DaCosta, 2001). A less savory
type of Internet pricing charges informed consum- mezger, 2005; Tso & Law, 2005), this study adds
a theoretical perspective to investigate three re- ers less and uniformed consumers more (Bayliss
& Perloff, 2002). Although Deck and Wilson (2002) search questions based on hotel direct channels.
Do hotels maintain consistent pricing across the argue that tracking customers’ website navigation
patterns can lead to price-matching strategies that communication channels they control? Do hotels
vary in their use of consistent pricing in the high blunt online competition, pricing based on cus-
tomer profiles raise another concern: unfair pricing. and low seasons? Finally, does diffusion of inno-
vations help explain hotel pricing practices across In a widely publicized example early this cen-
tury, Amazon charged customers different prices the direct communication channels they control?
for the same product (Deck & Wilson, 2002). In a
New York Times opinion piece on this incident, Literature Review
the distinguished economist Paul Krugman (2000)
Online Pricing
argued the dynamic pricing is undeniably unfair
and possibly illegal when people pay more be- Consumers began using the Internet to seek in-
formation and entertainment; today the Internet is cause of who they are. Legalities aside, perceived
price unfairness has negative consequences for also a convenient way to shop (Koch & Cebula,
2002; Kung, Monroe, & Cox, 2002; Vulkan, hotels and is an important topic (Kimes, 2002;
Rohlfs & Kimes, 2005; Wirtz, Kimes, Theng, & 2003). Since the dawn of electronic commerce, ac-
ademics and the media predicted that competition Patterson, 2003; Xia, Monroe, & Cox, 2004).
At least three studies showing varying hotel among Internet retailers would approach the theo-
retical economic model of perfect competition. prices, usually for the same room at the same time,
illustrate this possible perceived price unfairness Easily comparing web-based information on prices,
features, and quality increases cost transparency (O’Connor, 2003; Thompson & Failmezger, 2005;HOTEL PRICING ACROSS DISTRIBUTION CHANNELS 107
(Sinha, 2000). This transparency can force prices et al., 1997; Biswas, 2004). Online and offline,
brands decrease price elasticity and increase the down, such as for burial caskets and life insurance
(Clay, Krishnan, & Wolff, 2001; Levitt & Dubner, seller’s power (Kung et al., 2002; Oh, 2003; Vul-
kan, 2003). 2005; Vulkan, 2003).
The Internet also reduces search costs relative Conflicting results aside, cost transparency on
the Internet can impair the seller’s ability to obtain to visiting physical stores; shopbots and compari-
son sites lower search costs even further (Cheva- high margins, even for name brands, and turns
goods and services into commodities (Sinha, 2000). lier & Goolsbee, 2003). Reducing search costs
should intensify price competition and increase Thus, it becomes increasingly difficult for some
companies to earn a profit (Birch & Young, 1997). searching for better prices (Jiang, 2002). Paradoxi-
cally, the growing number of web pages—the This negative outcome supports arguments that
hoteliers should heed the trend of lower prices on- popular search engine Google indexed over 8 bil-
lion pages in June 2005—makes finding a better line and carefully monitor their prices across on-
line and offline distribution channels (Enz, 2003; price increasingly tedious. As the economics of in-
formation theory argues, buyers “acquire informa- O’Connor & Piccoli, 2003; Thompson & Fail-
mezger, 2005). tion till the point where the marginal cost of ac-
quiring additional information equals or exceeds
Traditional Hotel Industry Pricing the marginal benefit” (Biswas, 2004, p. 725).
Online consumers may give up searching, opt- The intangible nature of service and the perish-
able nature of hotel rooms complicate pricing de- ing to save time rather than save money (Clay et
al., 2001; Koch & Cebula, 2002; Suri, Long, & cisions, such as differential pricing based on costs,
locations, customer segments, and market willing- Monroe, 2004; Varini et al., 2003; Yelkur & Da-
Costa, 2001). The previously mentioned meta- ness to pay (Yelkur & DaCosta, 2001). Firms,
however, must justify differential pricing to the search engine Kayak.com, however, expands and
simplifies the search process, saving consumers consumer (Kimes, 2002; Rohlfs & Kimes, 2005;
Vulkan, 2003; Xia et al., 2004). One way hotels time by searching hundreds of sites simultaneously.
Increased access to online information supports justify different prices is by adding value such as
access to special amenities (e.g., gym or parking) that consumers may find greater price dispersion
in online markets than in offline markets (Ancar- or services, yet evidence from Switzerland sug-
gests that the industry has little knowledge regard- ani & Shankar, 2004; Pan, Ratchford, & Shankar,
2003). Studies of books and airline tickets showed ing customers’ willingness to pay for these ame-
nities (Varini et al., 2003). Added benefits aside, online price differences ranging from 18% to 59%
(Clay et al., 2001; Koch & Cebula, 2002). The hotel rooms are perishable.
For hotels, as well as other industries with per- greater the perceived price dispersion, the more
likely that consumers will search for better prices ishable inventories, revenue management is a logi-
cal evolution of pricing (Hanks et al., 2002). Reve- (Biswas, 2004). The consensus among research-
ers—price dispersion among Internet retailers is nue management matches prices to current inventory
and demand, and then selects the optimal rate for large and online prices are modestly lower or actu-
ally higher compared to offline prices—contra- maximizing capacity and revenue (Toh & Dekay,
2002). This variable or demand-based pricing dicts the notion that the Internet has eliminated
consumer search costs (Chevalier & Goolsbee, means that guests could pay a different price for
each night of their stay. Best-available rate pric- 2003).
Prices may be higher online due to factors such ing, a guaranteed lowest available rate for each
night, helps reduce possible guest confusion over as auctions, price discrimination, shipping charges,
and branding (Ancarani & Shankar, 2004; Koch & demand-based pricing. Research suggests that for
multiple-night stays, customers prefer individual Cebula, 2002; Kung et al., 2002; Vulkan, 2003).
Consumers shopping in an interactive environ- rates for each night rather than an average price
per night over the stay (Rohlfs & Kimes, 2005, ment favor a familiar brand over an unfamiliar one
due to the known brand’s implicit guarantee (Alba p. 4).108 MURPHY, SCHEGG, AND QIU
Most US hotels, particularly mid-market hotels travel agents, their own websites, and new Internet
intermediaries. In Western Europe, intermediary and less so low-market hotels, practice revenue
management through dynamic pricing based on sales were 36% of online sales in 2003 (Marcus-
sen, 2004), but intermediaries change the econom- occupancy levels (Enz & Canina, 2005). But not
all hotels adopt this approach. Apart from resorts ics of distribution by selling rooms beyond the ho-
telier’s control, dictating prices, and charging fees that charge high- and low-season prices, most
Swiss hoteliers—especially small and independent that erode hotel profits (Caroll & Siguaw, 2003;
Enz, 2003; O’Connor & Piccoli, 2003; Sigala & properties—practice few sophisticated techniques,
changing their prices just annually (Varini et al., Buhalis, 2002).
The above results, however, differ in a country 2003). Compared to lower rated hotels, however,
five-star Swiss hotels vary their prices more often with few chain hotels and mostly independent op-
erators, such as Switzerland. A survey of over 200 based upon supply and demand.
Category aside, hoteliers use several pricing Swiss hotels showed that three out of four book-
ings came through direct channels: 44% through options. In slow times, hotels let customers re-
quest prices lower than the quoted price (Hanks et telephone/fax contacts, 13% through the hotel
website, and 17% through e-mail (Schegg & Steiner, al., 2002; O’Connor, 2003). In busy times, hotels
overbook in order to cover last-minute cancella- 2003). The proportion of direct booking was
higher in one- to three-star hotels (75–80%) than tions (Toh & Dekay, 2002). Hotels also borrow
from airline practices of advanced purchase dis- in four- to five-star hotels (67%). Online interme-
diaries had only a small market share (4%) in counts and variable refunds through single rates,
room type rates, and fenced rates (Hanks et al., these Swiss hotels.
Understandably, some hotels dislike net-based 2002). Fenced rates, one of several suggested on-
line pricing options, include prepaid and nonre- travel intermediaries (Marvel, 2004). Hotel chains
such as Cendant, Hilton, Marriott, and Starwood fundable stays in exchange for a reduced price,
or upgrades, amenities, and fewer restrictions in now guarantee the lowest online rate in order to
woo customers away from online intermediaries exchange for a higher price (O’Connor & Piccoli,
2003; Rohlfs & Kimes, 2005). and to their site (Rohlfs & Kimes, 2005). Four
Seasons has dropped online intermediaries and has
no bookings via third-party websites (Marvel, Online Distribution: Changing Rules
2004). Research suggests that this trend will con- in the Hospitality Industry
tinue and the share of the third-party websites sites
should drop from 50% in 2002 to 45% by 2005 Thanks to the Internet, travel companies such
as low-cost carriers Easyjet and Ryan Air apply (PhocusWright and Bear Stearns reports, cited in
Marvel, 2004). distribution-based pricing successfully, charge ad-
ditional fees or different rates based on distribu- Hotels should direct reservations to channels
with lower operating costs—their own websites tion channels (O’Connor, 2003). The impact of
online pricing in the airline industry has led online (O’Connor & Piccoli, 2003). In addition to paying
no commissions on their website sales, hotels can intermediaries such as Expedia, Orbitz, and Trav-
elocity to expand beyond airline tickets and to ho- adjust the inventory instantaneously, adapting room
prices to the supply and demand (O’Connor, 2003). tel rooms (Thompson & Failmezger, 2005). This
growing online competition underscores the im- Given the right technology, hotels could also ad-
just prices based on customer purchasing behavior portance of hotels understanding the distribution
costs and distribution shares associated with each and website navigation (Ancarani, 2002; Iyer et
al., 2002; Sotgiu & Ancarani, 2004). channel (O’Connor & Frew, 2002).
Horwath’s Worldwide Industry Study lists di- Across channels, two suggested pricing strate-
gies for hotels are maintaining consistent prices rect contact—telephone, fax, and email—as the
predominant hotel distribution channel but this chan- and varying the price according to the channel—
low prices in low-cost channels and high prices in nel dropped from 38% in 1995 to 34% in 2002
(Marvel, 2004). Online, hotels sell rooms via high-cost channels (O’Connor & Piccoli, 2003). AHOTEL PRICING ACROSS DISTRIBUTION CHANNELS 109
later study argues for consistent rates across all website navigation, and price fences. The litera-
ture review also included arguments that custom- channels, especially the hotel’s direct channels.
Consistent pricing saves consumers time searching ers dislike price unfairness, and suggested price
consistency across all channels, particularly the di- for better rates as well as assuring consumers of
the best rate (Thompson & Failmezger, 2005). rect channels that the hotel controls. Five hospital-
ity industry studies shed light on these arguments
and support further investigation of price consis- Perceived Pricing Fairness
tency.
In essence, hoteliers have a smorgasbord of
In an early study, Yelkur and DaCosta (2001)
pricing options. Ample literature supports pricing
investigated online pricing by 20 major hotel firms
based on customers’ past behavior or based on the
present in Chicago. They argued that the Internet
hotel’s supply and demand. Despite the underlying
facilitated differential pricing in order to target
rationale for this dynamic pricing, inconsistent
profitable consumer segments based on four fac-
prices can raise consumer perceptions of unfair
tors: demographics, socioeconomic, trip purpose,
pricing and lead to confused customers question-
and customer loyalty. They found that hotel groups
ing and complaining about prices that seem unfair
such as Marriott (Marriott Renaissance and Court-
(Cox & Dale, 2001; Kimes, 2002; Vulkan, 2003;
yard) and Bass (Holiday Inn and Crowne Plaza)
Yelkur & DaCosta, 2001). These perceptions can
adopted a common pricing practice across their
cause customers to defect, spread negative infor-
properties and that US companies tended to offer
mation, and instigate other actions that damage the
more differential pricing based on market segments
seller (Bolton, Warlop, & Alba, 2003; Wirtz et al.,
than non-US companies.
2003; Xia et al., 2004).
In perhaps the first study of pricing across
The results of 10 experiments on price fairness
channels, O’Connor (2003) investigated pricing by
suggest that consumer knowledge of prices con-
45 leading brands via the hotel website, hotel cen-
tributes to perceived unfairness (Xia et al., 2004)
tral reservation system, and third-party websites
and “from a consumer’s perspective, price differ-
(intermediaries). He found that one out of three
ences appear fair(est) only if they can be attributed
brands offered consistent pricing across the three
to quality differences” (Bolton et al., 2003, p.
channels. Economy and mid-price hotels offered
488). Yet it is hard to argue quality differences for
lower prices via their websites compared to prices
the same hotel room for the same date and booked
from the central reservation service or third-party
at the same time.
websites. With up-market brands, however, rates
Furthermore, as the degree of transaction simi-
were more likely to be higher on the hotel website
larity may relate to perceptions of price unfairness
compared to the other two channels.
(Xia et al., 2004), guests may question if whether
Given travel agents’ strong role in hotel distri-
they contact the hotel by telephone or by email
bution, Lehman (2003) compared agency catalogue
will influence the room price. Consistent rates
and online prices for vacation packages to three
across channels, however, let consumers spend
Red Sea resorts. The results failed to support lower
less time searching and “confidently book the
Internet prices and price dispersion and suggested
hotel via any channel, while still being assured of
a negative relationship with resort category. Com-
the best rates” (Thompson & Failmezger, 2005, p.
pared to offline prices, the two lower category re-
15). In addition to confused customers and price
sorts tended to have higher online prices and price
fairness issues, the greater the perceived price dis-
dispersion, while the luxury resort tended to have
persion the more likely consumers should search
lower online prices and price dispersion.
for a better price (Biswas, 2004; Thompson &
Tso and Law (2005) compared online pricing
Failmezger, 2005).
by 45 Hong Kong hotels across seven channels:
Expedia, Travelocity, TravelWeb, Hotels.com, Wing
Studies of Hotels’ Online Pricing
OnTravel.com (a local agency), the hotel website,
and voice. The findings, collected over five con- The previous sections noted arguments for pric-
ing based on customer demand, user profiles, user secutive months, revealed significant differences110 MURPHY, SCHEGG, AND QIU
among the seven channels for the one- to five- search suggests that organizations adopt innovations
over time (Rogers, 1995), from trialing the inno- star hotels; indirect distribution channels had
lower online prices than the hotel’s direct chan- vation, to gaps in assimilating the innovation
(Fichman, 2000; Fichman & Kemerer, 1999), and nels of the website and telephone receptionists.
Across the seven channels, the hotel’s website finally to using the innovation well (Cooper &
Zmud, 1990; Zmud & Apple, 1992). E-Business was the most expensive channel for the three-star
category, the second most expensive for four-star adoption includes adding web-based processes
(Dinlersoz & Herna ´ndez-Murillo, 2005) or fea- hotels, and the third most expensive for the five-
star category. For all hotel categories, the local tures (Murphy, Olaru, Schegg, & Frey, 2003), and
evolving website strategies (Dholakia & Kshetri, travel agency offered lower room rates than the
six other channels. 2004; Doolin, Burgess, & Cooper, 2002; Teo &
Pian, 2003). Finally, Thompson and Failmezger (2005) com-
pared rates and availability across five channels— For example, some organizations “failed to es-
tablish procedures that move them to successful telephone, Expedia, Orbitz, Travelocity, and the
hotel’s website—by over 100 US hotels. On aver- implementation of the most basic Internet tool,
email” (Murphy & Tan, 2003, p. 548). Electronic age across four market segments—luxury, upscale,
mid-market, and budget—Travelocity, followed distribution, especially the growth of web-based
travel intermediaries, has added further complex- by the hotel website, had the lowest booking cost.
Calling the hotel yielded the highest prices and the ity and dynamics in managing hotel distribution
systems. Just as organizations fail to establish pro- most variance. In the luxury market, calling the
hotel resulted in the lowest cost but the hotel web- cedures for using email technology, hotels that
adopt the Internet may fail to establish procedures site yielded the lowest cost with budget and mid-
market properties. Similar to other studies, they for pricing their rooms across distribution chan-
nels. found wide discrepancies in rates and suggested
that consumers shop around. Travelocity usually Hotels that implement Internet technologies
well should, all things being equal, aim towards offered the best prices, but the authors estimated
that comparison shopping would save consumers consistent pricing across the direct communication
channels that they control: email, telephone, and more than 5%.
The five studies illustrate varying online and static price lists on websites. Consistent pricing for
the same room on the same date and requested offline pricing practices, but differ on the relation-
ship between category and pricing practices. Fur- at the same time would minimize perceived price
unfairness, price dispersion, and consumers seek- thermore, the studies fail to focus on the channel
recommended by two studies (O’Connor & Pic- ing a better price. Yet research has shown that ho-
tels charge myriad prices for the same room at the coli, 2003; Thompson & Failmezger, 2005): hotel
websites. When guests arrive at the hotel’s web- same time.
Diffusion research has shown that organiza- site, will static prices on the website differ from
prices gathered via other communication media tional characteristics—size and category—relate
positively to hotels having (Schegg, Steiner, Frey, that the hotel controls—calling or emailing the ho-
tel? This study follows up and extends previous & Murphy, 2002; Siguaw, Enz, & Namiasivayam,
2000; Wei, Ruys, van Hoof, & Combrink, 2001) studies by introducing a theoretic approach, ex-
ploring other independent variables related to pric- and implementing (Gherissi-Labben, Schegg, &
Murphy, 2003; Murphy, Olaru et al., 2003; ing, and examining prices in the high and low sea-
sons. Schegg, Murphy, & Leuenberger, 2003) Internet
technologies. Larger and higher rated hotels have
better financial and personnel resources to manage Conceptual Development
booking inquiries across multiple communication
channels. Investigating these early adopters should Diffusion of innovations argues that organiza-
tions vary in how they assimilate new technolo- shed light on pricing across direct communication
channels. Thus: gies, such as the Internet, into their business. Re-HOTEL PRICING ACROSS DISTRIBUTION CHANNELS 111
Research Question 1: Does hotel size relate to based request forms, static price lists on hotel
websites, and calling the hotel. Given the conflict- consistent pricing for the same type room on the
same date and requested at the same time? ing results in pricing based on hotel category
(Lehman, 2003; O’Connor, 2003), the study also Research Question 2: Does hotel category relate
to consistent pricing for the same type room on compares pricing across hotel categories in both
high and low seasons. the same date and requested at the same time?
Sampling for this study stemmed from the 1558
One measure of when an organization adopts Swiss Hotel Association (SHA) hotels with a web-
the Internet is the age of that organization’s do- site. The SHA includes nearly all mid- to high-
main name. These names, the suffix in a hotel’s class hotels, underrepresents the budget sector,
email address and website address, usually include and accounts for nearly 80% of all hotel overnight
the hotel’s name. For Australian businesses (Ngu- stays in Switzerland (www.hotelleriesuisse.ch, ac-
yen, Murphy, & Olaru, 2003) and the world’s top cessed October 12, 2005). As higher rated hotels
brands (Murphy, Raffa, & Mizerski, 2003), orga- registered domain names earlier than did lower
nizational size relates positively to having a bran- rated hotels (Scaglione, Schegg, Steiner, & Mur-
ded domain name, such as hyatt.com or hilton. phy, 2004a), the proportion of four- to five-star
com. Tourism studies suggest that having these hotels was higher in this subpopulation. A random
branded electronic addresses relates to a later step process, stratified across hotel category, selected
of organizational Internet adoption—quality email 130 hotels with a website (13% zero to two-star
replies (Murphy, Olaru et al., 2003; Murphy & hotels, 37% three-star hotels, and 48% four- to
Tan, 2003). five-star hotels). The study gathered the domain
As noted earlier, organizations evolve in their name age for each hotel from the Swiss domain
implementation of new technologies. Research has name database (www.switch.ch).
used domain name age as a temporal measure of The first survey gathered prices from three
Internet adoption. The earlier an organization reg- communication media that the hotel controls: tele-
isters its domain name, the more successful the phone, email, and online price lists. The survey
organization’s implementation of its website (Go- asked for just one room night during a slow period
sain & Faraj, 2001). Thus: for Swiss hotels. To increase the validity of the
findings and to reduce overgeneralizing the results Research Question 3: Does the domain name
(Babbie, 1997), a second survey replicated the age of a hotel relate to consistent pricing for the
study during the busy season and for 1 week rather same type room on the same date and requested
than for 1 day. The procedure was the same, ex- at the same time?
cept for including a fourth channel: reservation re-
quest forms on the website. Similar to email, the Research has shown that hotel size and cate-
gory relate positively to the adoption and imple- online forms send an electronic request to the ho-
tel, which hotel employees then answer via email. mentation of technology. Furthermore, domain
name reflects a temporal measure of Internet adop- Adding this fourth channel helped further explore
how hotels implement the Internet with regard to tion. Exploring how hotels that tend to lead in the
adoption of Internet technologies, larger and room prices.
To ensure a high response rate, both survey re- higher rated hotels, as well as hotels that led in the
adoption of domain names, should shed light on quests included a nearby alternative date in case
the hotel was booked for the primary date. To re- pricing practices of the early adopters.
duce possible influence from multiple requests for
the same dates, both surveys varied the informa- Methodology
tion requests—email, telephone, and online form
in the second survey—so that no one channel was This study extends three previous studies (O’Con-
nor, 2003; Thompson & Failmezger, 2005; Tso & always first or last. To reduce possible bias due to
different room types, all information requests Law, 2005) by focusing on four communication
media under the hotel’s direct control: email, web- asked for a simple, standard room.112 MURPHY, SCHEGG, AND QIU
Results basic room at the same date—of almost double
the price depending on the direct channel used.
The results showed varying use of direct com-
munication channels for pricing. All 130 hotels Average Channel Prices
had an email address and telephone number on
The next two analyses, average channel prices their website. Over 9 out of 10 hotels (92%) listed
and matched prices by channel, explored if any a price on their site and about two out of three
channel tended to be more or less expensive. Fig- hotels (65%) offered a web form letting customers
ure 2 shows the average high- and low-season request information. Although not a focus of this
prices per channel. In both surveys, hotels offered study due to a low presence in a past Swiss study
lower prices via online channels—websites and (Schegg et al., 2002), one in eight hotels (12%)
email—and calling the hotel gave the most expen- offered real-time bookings to let customers reserve
sive average price. a room directly over the web. Just one hotel listed
The results of a paired sample t-test showed a special Internet price on the website, but this
that telephone prices in the first survey, the low study used the basic rate on the website rather than
season, were significantly higher than prices via the Internet special.
email [t(110) = 2.964, p = 0.004] and on the web- Filtering out hotels closed during the booking
site [t(110) = 2.367, p = 0.02]. Similar to the first time or those that failed to reply yielded 121 ho-
study, the paired sample t-test showed that calling tels with telephone and email rates and 111 hotels
the hotel yielded prices significantly higher than with rates across three media: telephone, email,
hotel website prices [t(110) = 2.317, p = 0.022]. and prices on the website. The second survey,
Differences between telephone and email prices in which added room rates through web request
the second survey were insignificant, suggesting forms, allowed comparing 71 hotels on four media
less price variance across channels during the high and 111 hotels across the first three channels. As
season. this study investigated price consistency, the anal-
A final analysis examined the 71 hotels in the ysis compared prices for the same hotel and for
second survey with prices for all four channels. the same date.
Again, the highest average rate across all channels To validate the assumption that larger and
was the telephone (175.4 CHF). Responses to res- higher rated hotels lead in the adoption of Internet
ervation request forms (167.9 CHF) were the next technology, two statistical tests correlated domain
most expensive, followed by website prices (169.0 name age with the number of rooms and category;
CHF) and then by prices via email (166.9 CHF). both correlation tests confirmed the assumption.
The results of paired sample t-tests showed that There were significant (p < 0.001) and positive
telephone prices were significantly higher than correlations with domain name age and both hotel
rates from email [t(70) = 2.2326, p = 0.023], the size (Pearson’s correlation = 0.441) and hotel cate-
website [t(70) = 2.139, p = 0.036], and reservation gory (Spearman’s rho = 0.475).
request forms [t(70) = 2.049, p = 0.044].
Extreme Price Differences Matched Prices by Channel
The wide range of prices between one-star and In order to highlight price unfairness, Figure 1
shows the most egregious price differences found five-star hotels may have influenced the results us-
ing average prices. Given this possible bias, a non- in this study. In the first case, a customer that
sought a basic room received a price of 39 Swiss parametric sign test (Kenkel, 1995) also examined
the price differences. This test analyzes matched Francs (CHF) via email and a price of 80 CHF via
the telephone—a difference of 205% for the same pairs, ranking a channel’s price as higher, lower,
or equal to another channel. In each matched data date. Alternatively, in the second case a customer
would have seen a price of 98 CHF via email and pair if A > B ,a“ +” is assigned to the pair; if A <
B ,a“ −” is assigned to the pair, and if A = B, the heard 48 CHF on the phone. Although the differ-
ences were less extreme in the other four cases, pair is eliminated from the sample and the sample
size decreases accordingly. customers could still receive quotes—for the sameHOTEL PRICING ACROSS DISTRIBUTION CHANNELS 113
Figure 1. Extreme price differences between channels.
Figure 2. Average prices across three channels (n = 111).114 MURPHY, SCHEGG, AND QIU
Table 1, the results of the nonparametric sign To test the research questions, a series of bivar-
iate correlations examined relationships between test, shows how often prices were equal, less, or
more as well as the z score and significance level price consistency and three hotel characteristics:
number of rooms, number of stars, and domain (two-tailed test). Telephone prices in both surveys
were more expensive than online prices, signifi- name age. Price consistency, operationalized as
the number of times prices disagreed across chan- cantly so compared to email prices in the first sur-
vey and website prices in the second survey. There nels, ranged from zero if the price via email, the
website, and telephone was the same to a maxi- were no significant differences in prices among
the Internet channels in either season. mum of three if all three prices differed. As not
every website had a web-based form, the results
in Table 2 compare the three channels used in both Consistent Pricing
surveys.
The two previous analyses—average channel
In general, the results support significant rela-
prices and matched prices by channel—confirm
tionships with price consistency and the three in-
that the hotels in this study tended to quote the
dependent variables found in previous diffusion
highest price on the telephone. Yet the analyses
studies: number of rooms, number of stars, and
shed few insights on offering the same price
domain name age. The direction of the relation-
across channels. Consistent prices across all chan-
ship, however, varied depending upon the season.
nels assure consumers of the best rate and save
During the low season, hotel size and domain
them time searching for better rates (Thompson &
name age showed a significant negative correla-
Failmezger, 2005).
tion with consistent prices. In the high season,
The proportion of hotels with equal rates across
however, hotel size and number of stars showed a
three channels—telephone, email, and prices list
significant positive correlation with consistent
on the websites—was marginally higher in the
pricing. In essence, those hotels (i.e., larger and
first survey (41%) than in the second survey
higher rated properties) that tended to adopt tech-
(37%). Across both surveys, hotels with consistent
nologies earlier, tended to have more consistent
pricing (39%) was higher than in O’Connor’s
pricing in the low season and less consistent pric-
(2003) study of 45 major hotel brands (33%). This
ing in the high season.
comparison, however, fails to account for O’Con-
nor (2003) investigating more channels and the
Conclusions and Future Research
current study covering two seasons. Finally, about
six out of seven (86%) hotels gave identical prices Managerial Implications
via web forms and email, possibly explained by
Ample research, as well as common sense, ar-
the same employee answering email and web form
gues that customers dislike unfair pricing (Bolton
requests.
et al., 2003; Cox & Dale, 2001; Kimes, 2002; Vul-
kan, 2003; Wirtz et al., 2003; Xia et al., 2004;
Table 1 Yelkur & DaCosta, 2001). That a customer could,
all things being equal, pay double the price for Matched Prices Across Channels
the same hotel room depending upon whether they
Channel Pair Equal Less More z Score p
called or emailed the hotel should strike many cus-
Survey 1 (low season) tomers as unfair.
Tel/email 67 19 35 2.18 0.02 At least two studies argue for consistent pricing
Tel/web 57 20 34 1.91 0.06
of rooms, particularly across the hotel’s direct Email/web 59 28 24 −0.55 0.58
Survey 2 (high season) channels, as well as for directing online customers
Tel/email 69 20 32 1.66 0.10 to the hotel’s website rather than to a third-party
Tel/web 60 14 37 3.22 <0.01
website (O’Connor, 2003; Thompson & Fail- Tel/web form 43 14 21 1.18 0.24
Email/web 48 36 27 1.13 0.26 mezger, 2005). Even if customers find a lower
Email/web form 66 8 4 −1.15 0.25 price via a third-party website, for example by ho-
Web/web form 41 26 15 −1.72 0.09
tels losing control of their distribution (Caroll &HOTEL PRICING ACROSS DISTRIBUTION CHANNELS 115
Table 2
Correlation of Hotel Characteristics and Price Consistency
Survey 1 Survey 2
(Low Season) (High Season)
Spearman’s Significance Spearman’s Significance
Rho (Two-Tailed) Rho (Two-Tailed)
Rooms −0.297 p = 0.001 +0.227 p = 0.012
Stars −0.134 p = 0.144 +0.247 p = 0.006
Domain name age −0.272 p = 0.006 +0.005 p = 0.964
Siguaw, 2003; Enz, 2003; O’Connor & Piccoli, tions to price differences and provide appropriate
information and explanations for these differences 2003), some hotels seem to strive for more consis-
tent pricing by guaranteeing the lowest online rate (Rohlfs & Kimes, 2005; Wirtz et al., 2003; Xia et
al., 2004). Customers should have access to avail- (Rohlfs & Kimes, 2005). Academic suggestions
and industry practices appear to be migrating to- able pricing options and employees must be able
to clarify the product differentiation (Kimes, 2002; wards consistent pricing for the same room,
booked at the same time for the same date. Rohlfs & Kimes, 2005). Finally, management
should train employees to deal with negative cus- This study, however, found that about one out
of two Swiss hotels offered multiple rates to cus- tomer reactions to perceived unfair pricing, such
as by offering compensation and allowing the cus- tomers—seemingly for the same room—with the
difference in rates sometimes over 200%. These tomer to vent their frustration (Xia et al., 2004).
results suggest that Swiss hotels, and most likely
non-Swiss hotels, should review the pricing—for Academic Implications
the same room for the same dates—across chan-
nels that they control. In addition to in-house poli- Compared to the traditional telephone channel,
the results of this study showed that Swiss hotels’ cies and procedures, hotel management should use
a simple mystery shopping survey such as the one prices were slightly more advantageous for the
customers via direct online channels, static web- in this study to verify what prices customers will
receive across different direct and indirect chan- site price lists, and email responses. The better dis-
tinction may be between synchronous and asyn- nels.
Still, hotels may want to practice differential chronous channels. When buyers and sellers can
negotiate simultaneously, the seller may report a pricing or have problems implementing consistent
pricing. For the former, hotels should decrease the higher initial price yet be prepared to negotiate
downward. With asynchronous channels, however, transaction similarity to help customers grasp the
logic behind different prices. Successful trans- the seller may report a lower initial price in order
to keep the customer. parent pricing by low-cost airlines reflects that
customers understand, and appreciate, dynamic Similar to other studies in the hospitality indus-
try, this article extends and replicates hotel cate- pricing. For the latter, based on their review of
competitor’s prices, pricing across channels, and gory and hotel size as significant independent vari-
ables related to the adoption of Internet technologies. channel distribution costs, hotels should define
and communicate a coherent and transparent pric- Unlike early studies that investigated the presence
of Internet tools (Schegg et al., 2002; Siguaw et ing policy to all stakeholders. This means, for ex-
ample, updating the pricing information on the al., 2000; Wei et al., 2001), this study followed a
recent trend in adoption research—how hotels use websites and training telephone/email reception-
ists to market appropriate rates to potential cus- those tools (Gherissi-Labben et al., 2003; Murphy,
Olaru et al., 2003; Schegg et al., 2003). This study tomers.
Management should anticipate customer reac- also added an independent variable related to In-116 MURPHY, SCHEGG, AND QIU
ternet adoption—domain name age (Scaglione et rates, fences, and restrictions during such periods
in the larger hotels? Or do these hotels give higher al., 2004a; Scaglione, Schegg, Steiner, & Murphy,
2004b). These three variables—hotel size, hotel rates on the telephone as they know that they prob-
ably do not have to negotiate down in the high category, and domain name age—related to the
implementation of Internet technologies, showing season?
significant correlations with pricing practices in
both the high season and low season. Limitations and Future Research
The three variables—category, rooms, and do-
main name age—related to consistent pricing in The results of this exploratory study fail to gen-
eralize to non-Swiss Hotel Association hotels as the low season, with the latter two showing re-
spective significance levels of 0.001 and 0.006. well as non-Swiss hotels. Furthermore, Swiss ho-
tels are predominantly SMEs that only change The larger the hotel and the higher the category,
the more likely the hotel had consistent pricing. prices annually (Varini et al., 2003). Longitudinal
Swiss studies, including non-Swiss Hotel Associa- Yet in the high season, size and category showed
significant relationship, 0.012 and 0.006, respec- tion hotels and comparison studies in other coun-
tries, could clarify if this late 2001 snapshot re- tively, with inconsistent pricing.
That domain name age showed a positive rela- flects an aberration or trend. Similarly, future
research should examine a common independent tionship with consistent pricing in the low season
but no relationship in the high season could reflect variable related to hotel adoption of technology—
chain affiliation (Siguaw et al., 2000; Wei et al., a further stage of Internet implementation. The
longer a hotel had a domain name (i.e., adopted 2001).
Hotels may let customers request prices lower the Internet), the more likely that hotel had consis-
tent pricing across the channels it controlled in the than the quoted price (Hanks et al., 2002; O’Con-
nor, 2003), but this study did not ask for lower low season. Unlike the larger and higher rated ho-
tels though, hotels that adopted the Internet earlier prices nor for the lowest price. As noted earlier,
hotels may tend to price higher in synchronous showed no significant relationship with inconsis-
tent pricing in the high season. channels compared to asynchronous channels. Fu-
ture studies could further standardize the room re- As shown earlier in this study, hotel size and
category showed a significant and positive rela- quest and ask for a better price via both channels,
as well as add other synchronous channels [e.g., tionship with domain name age. Yet hotel size and
category, but not domain name age, relate to in- walk-in requests, online chat, and Internet tele-
phony such as Skype (www.skype.com)]. consistent pricing in the high season. This counter-
intuitive result helps support the premise that orga- Intermediaries played no role in this study and
one could argue that distribution costs were equal nizations evolve in their use of technology, from
trialing the innovation, to gaps in assimilating the for the channels in this study. Regardless of how
the customer reserved the room in this study— innovation (Fichman, 2000; Fichman & Kemerer,
1999), and finally to using the innovation well telephone, email, or web form—a human eventu-
ally took the reservation. Still, hotels may have (Cooper & Zmud, 1990; Zmud & Apple, 1992).
Domain name age, rather than the organizational had a rationale for different prices for the seem-
ingly same room. Future research could investi- characteristics, may be a better gauge of evolving
website strategies. gate other distribution routes such as online inter-
mediaries and travel agents, as well as the impact In the low season, everything seems as sug-
gested (O’Connor, 2003; Thompson & Failmezger, on pricing of their respective distribution costs.
Similarly, future research could investigate larger 2005), with the bigger and higher category hotels
leading in the use of consistent pricing. Yet the and chain-affiliated hotels’ use of dynamic pricing
in both direct and indirect channels. results in the high season raise several future re-
search questions. Is it good practice to have incon- In closing, further research should go beyond
descriptive measure of consistent or inconsistent sistent pricing in the high-demand season? Do em-
ployees loose their control in the communication pricing. One such track could draw upon two re-
cent studies that examine consumer behavior, such of rates in the high season? Are there too manyHOTEL PRICING ACROSS DISTRIBUTION CHANNELS 117
Ancarani, F. (2002). Pricing and the Internet: Frictionless as shopping around (Thompson & Failmezger,
commerce or pricer’s paradise. European Management 2005) and reacting to dynamic pricing (Rohlfs &
Journal, 20(6), 680–687. Kimes, 2005). Another track would investigate Ancarani, F., & Shankar, V. (2004). Price levels and price
how these pricing practices relate to hotel profit- dispersion within and across multiple retailer types:
Further evidence and extension. Journal of the Academy ability. Related to success measures of customer
of Marketing Science, 32(2), 176–188. satisfaction and hotel profitability, research should
Babbie, E. R. (1997). The practice of social research (8th draw upon organizational diffusion of innovations
ed.). Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing.
to further examine successful implementation of Bayliss, K., & Perloff, J. M. (2002). Price dispersion on the
hotel pricing across new media such as email, Internet: Good firms and bad firms. Review of Industrial
Organization, 21(3), 305–324. web, chat, Internet telephony, interactive TV, etc.
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